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Chapter 15
The Pension System in Argentina
Rafael Rofman

Introduction
Founded more than a century ago, Argentina’s pension system is one of
the oldest in the world. Natural maturation and legislative changes progressively converted what was initially a highly fragmented contributive scheme
into a mostly integrated model (see the discussion on system fragmentation
later in this chapter). The current pension system enjoys growing fiscal
support but declining coverage.
The 2001–2 fiscal and financial crises in Argentina created special interest in its pension system as many wondered about the resilience of the
new funded schemes. Looking back a few years, to the worst of the crisis,
it is clear that while the system and its beneficiaries suffered from the
institutional confusion and financial turmoil, there are no lasting concerns
arising from the crisis. The main challenges of the pension system continue to be around coverage, institutional design, pension fund managers’
efficiency, and fragmentation—the same problems that a paper written in
the late 1990s would have listed.

The Prehistory of Pensions in Argentina
The pension system in Argentina originated at the onset of the twentieth
century, when in 1904 the government created a regime to cover civil
servants. In 1915, with the creation of a program to benefit rail workers, the
system began to expand to other sectors. By 1944 six autonomous national
pension funds existed, covering approximately 7 percent of the labor force.
Workers were able to retire as young as 47 years and could receive benefits
close to 90 percent of their pre-retirement salaries. Not surprisingly, several
of these funds had serious financial problems.
The legal and actual coverage of the pension systems expanded rapidly
from 1945 to 1955, a period that saw a large number of social reforms. By
1956 almost every sector of the economy was covered by a pension scheme,
and the proportion of the labor force effectively enrolled in the pension
system was close to 30 percent. That same year, the number of beneficiaries
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was still relatively low, at around 500,000, or 25 percent of the population
aged 55 years or older.
While the early programs had been designed as funded DC schemes,
increasing financial problems and government interventions forced a conversion into PAYGO schemes. By the late 1960s most national programs
were integrated into three centralized schemes: for civil servants, private
employees, and the self-employed. To increase the financial sustainability
of the schemes, the government adjusted the regulations. This reform was
relatively successful; the system operated under reasonable conditions during most of the 1970s and early 1980s. However, by the mid-1980s, because
of the continued aging of system participants and increasing informality
in the economy, the system began to experience deficits. The government
adopted a risky strategy that eventually backfired; to maintain financial
stability, administrators ignored or ‘reinterpreted’ benefit indexation rules,
which linked benefits to active workers’ salaries. These actions resulted in
a decline of the real value of benefits and the replacement rates. Beneficiaries’ lawsuits against this practice rapidly multiplied, overwhelming the
legal system and forcing the government to declare a state of emergency.
By the early 1990s the system was unsustainable, so the government
proposed a structural reform. The debate about the proposed reform was
difficult, as differences in ideologies and interests were large. However,
after two years of debate, legislators approved a new law in October 1993
introducing a deep structural reform to the national pension system.

The Reforms
The 1993 pension reform was approved as the country was emerging from
its most serious macroeconomic crisis in decades, having experienced two
episodes of hyperinflation in 3 years; growing unemployment, informality,
and poverty; and a sharp 15 percent decline in per capita GDP. The reform
was partly inspired by Chile, where a funded scheme had replaced the
old PAYGO system in the early 1980s.1 The new design (SIJP, for Sistema
Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones, or Integrated Pension System) is
a mixed model, with participation from the government and the private
sector in its management, a combination of DB and DC components in the
benefit formula, and financial arrangements that include PAYGO, funding,
and tax financing elements.
The new model requires all workers in the private and the national public
sectors (including the self-employed) to contribute 11 percent of their
salaries; employers contribute 16 percent.2 All workers must participate in
the Regimen Previsional Público (the public pension scheme). They can
also enroll in a funded, privately managed scheme. As a result, benefits
have several components (see Figure 15-1).
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Public scheme
Pillar II Additional benefit (‘PAP’)
Pillar I

Private scheme
Annuity

Scheduled
withdrawal

Basic universal benefit (‘PBU’)

Figure 15-1. The integrated pension system (SIJP): benefit structure.

A worker retiring from the national system will receive a basic benefit
(PBU, for prestación básica universal, or ‘universal basic benefit’), equivalent
to approximately 27 percent of the average wage at the time of the reform,
as well as a benefit from the newer, smaller, publicly run PAYGO scheme
(PAP, for prestación adicional por permanencia, or ‘additional benefit’), or a
benefit financed by his or her accumulated contributions paid in the form
of an annuity or as a scheduled withdrawal.
The reform changed many aspects of the system, including its institutional setting, participation rules, risks distribution, and financing. These
changes comprise four basic dimensions, which can be considered independently, although their implementations are deeply connected and
sometimes mutually necessary due to political economy considerations.
The first dimension is a parametric reform. Most parameters in the system
were modified, including:

r contribution rates, which changed from 10 to 11 percent of wages for
workers’ contributions;

r retirement age, which increased by 5 years for both sexes, to 60/65
years for female/male workers;

r required number of years with contributions to retire, which increased
from 20 to 30;

r the benefit formula, which went from 70 percent of average of best
3 years for those retiring at the minimum age to an estimated 60–65
percent; and
r the indexation formula, which continued to be based on salaries but
had stronger links to collection.
These changes, which increased revenue or reduced expenditures, were
intended to improve the system’s finances. Their implementation reduced
both the expected number of beneficiaries and their average benefits,
limiting coverage of the system.
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The second dimension is a benefit formula reform. For many workers, the
new system introduced a new level of uncertainty by switching part of the
benefits from the traditional DB model to a DC scheme, or, more appropriately, an ‘undefined benefit’ model.3 With the introduction of individual
accounts, the state transferred to workers some risks, including those
related to financial volatility and population aging. While these changes
clearly improved the medium-term prospects for the state, transferring
risks to workers was a change that could be considered problematic, as
the pension system was also supposed to protect workers from those risks.
Three characteristics of the new scheme were aimed at limiting the impact
of these changes in workers: (a) the requirement to annuitize benefits at
retirement (or to choose a schedule withdrawal calculated as an annuity),
(b) the basic protection received by all workers from the PBU benefit, and
(c ) the minimum return regulation that reduces financial volatility in the
system.
The third dimension affected the financial scheme. Since the mid-1960s,
benefits had been financed by current contributions and treasury transfers, either through earmarked taxes or direct transfers. The new scheme,
implemented in July 1994, reintroduced a funded scheme, with part of
workers’ contributions accumulating in individual accounts and used to
pay benefits in the future. By diverting part of the contributions to the new
pension funds, the reform further increased the system’s dependency on
transfers from the central government, at least in the short and medium
term.
The fourth and final dimension of the reform introduced new actors
in the system from the private sector. The newly created private companies
would manage the pension funds for a fee. These managers are specialized
companies, responsible for administering the individual accounts, investing
funds, and paying benefits. They are also required to cover the cost of
disability and survivor’s benefits, for which they must get insurance from
an outside provider.
Each of the four dimensions described above could have been implemented independently. The government could have addressed fiscal problems by simply adjusting the parameters of the system. It could have
reduced its exposure to financial risks by introducing a variable benefit formula, as in the notional defined contribution schemes adopted in Sweden
and other European countries. Similarly, it could have created funding to
improve long-term financial sustainability without switching management
or using individual accounts. The private management of these accounts
was not a technical prerequisite for any of the other reforms.
Acknowledging that the pension reform in Argentina was in fact several reforms implemented at once allows for a clearer analysis of each
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of them and their outcomes, as well as the links between them. Several
analysts (Kay 2001; Brooks 2002) have studied Argentina and other countries in the region, considering the pension reform processes from a political science viewpoint, and many public statements by those involved in
the process are available. While the debate is far from being settled, it
seems clear that the parametric reform would have had a small chance
of being approved if proposed as an independent piece of legislation.
However, because it was bundled with other reforms that involved potential benefits to capital markets and provided better alignment of interests for workers (due to the individual accounts) and managers (due to
the participation of the private sector), it responded to the prevailing
political climate in the early 1990s and received sufficient support to be
approved.

The Impact of Reforms and the System in
the Past Decade
Assessing the impact of the pension reform is a difficult task. Differences
of opinion arise from the relatively short time that has elapsed since
its 1994 implementation (given that it covers a lifecycle of 60 or more
years), the lack of consensus regarding the actual goals of the reform,
differences in relevance assigned to short- and long-term effects (which
are in some cases contradictory), and a myriad of changes in the economic and social context as well as in the postreform legislation. Most
debates about the reform and its impacts in Argentina rapidly evolve
into a discussion on whether some particular trend can be attributed
to the reform or to other social processes that have taken place in the
same period, or whether the current system design is actually the result
of the 1993 reform or the accumulated adjustments applied since that
date.
In that context, this chapter considers the evolution and current state of
the pension system in three separate dimensions, discussing the possible
determinants of the observed changes, including the reforms of 1993 as a
contributing factor. The dimensions are:

r fiscal, where changes in current and expected fiscal impacts of the
pension system in the last decade are analyzed;

r coverage, where the role of the pension system as a provider of social
protection is considered; and

r other indirect impacts, through institutions or markets.
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Figure 15-2. Pension spending by government level (1980–2004). (Source: Ministry
of Economy 2005.)

The Fiscal Dimension
As discussed earlier, growing fiscal pressures were among the main triggers that initiated the pension reform process in the early 1990s. Pension
expenditures at the national level had risen from less than 3.5 percent
of GDP in the early 1980s to almost twice that number 10 years later.
Aggregated expenditures (including provincial and municipal schemes)
showed a similar trend, reaching almost 8.5 percent of GDP in 1992.
Figure 15-2 shows that, with some volatility, expenditures after the reform
stabilized at around 6.2 percent at the national level and 7.5–8 percent
at the aggregate level. In addition, most projections show that expenditures should start to decline, as old retirees die and new beneficiaries
receive benefits under the reformed legislation. As a result, expenditures
should decline in the medium term, reaching 2–2.5 percent of GDP by
2025.4
While the reform appears to have already slowed down expenditures, the
overall fiscal impact must be assessed considering the availability of funds
to finance them. As in any country that replaces a PAYGO with a funded
scheme, Argentina had a short-term cash flow problem that had to be
solved. Because benefits of workers who were already retired continued to
be paid and those retiring soon after the reform received a transitional benefit, the decline in expenditures has been a slow process. Moreover, when
the funded scheme was introduced in 1994 the public system immediately
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lost revenues as individual contributions began to be directed towards the
pension funds.
This ‘transition cost’ had to be financed until the system reached a new
equilibrium. Some analysts (e.g. Baker and Weisbrot 2002) have argued
that this cost was the main cause of the fiscal and financial crisis of late
2001 in Argentina. They estimated that if no reform had been enacted,
the country’s fiscal situation would have been much more solid, with small
fiscal surpluses in most of the years between 1993 and 2001. These estimates, published soon after the crisis, received wide media attention and
had significant political impact, yet they have some important flaws that
cannot be ignored.
Baker and Weisbrot (2002) assumed for their calculations that the transition cost was stable at 1 percent of GDP during the whole period. They did
not derive this figure themselves. Rather, they took it from an IMF (1998)
report that introduced it without any discussion of how it was derived. An
appropriate measurement of transition costs should consider the losses in
revenue, which slowly grew as active workers switched from the PAYGO
to the funded scheme, reaching 1.4 percent of GDP by 1999–2001. The
measurement should also consider the savings produced by the parametric
reform and the introduction of the funded scheme, which started paying
some benefits soon after 1994. While this last figure is difficult to estimate,
since no definitive counterfactual is available, there is no reason to assume
it is negligible, especially considering the sudden stop in spending growth
observed after the reform. Table 15-1 shows an estimate of these values.
Column (ii) shows the difference between actual spending and a projection
based on the growth of the elderly population and the growth of average
benefits. (The negative values for 1994 and 1995 are the result of an
increase in retirements immediately after the reform.) It is apparent that
the transition costs between 1994 and 2001 went from a maximum of 0.9
percent of GDP in 1995 to 0.1 percent by 2001.
The transition cost in Argentina was actually manageable, and lower than
in other countries in the region. However, the general fiscal pressures,
increased by political conflicts and inflexible monetary policies, resulted in
a major crisis in late 2001. In this context, the experience of Argentina
indicates that a pension reform, as any other policy that requires important
financial resources for several years, should only be implemented if this
financing is guaranteed, or at least feasible.

The Coverage Dimension
The heated debates during the early 1990s about the fiscal implications
of the pension system, or whether a funded scheme would operate more or
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Table 15-1 Transition Costs and Other Related
Policies in % of GDP (1993–2001)
Transition Cost

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Revenue
Loss (i)

Spending
Reduction (ii)

‘Pure’ Transition Cost
(iii) = (i) + (ii)

0.0
0.3
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.4

0.0
−0.6
−0.1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.9
1.3

0.0
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.1

Source: Rofman (2006).

less efficiently than a PAYGO model, or whether the private sector would be
more or less efficient than government, overlooked the topic of coverage,
which should always have been in the center of the debate. Pension systems
are social schemes designed to provide income protection to the elderly,
under the assumption that if the task were left to them, most individuals
would not be able to save enough during their active years. The problem
of providing goods and services to the elderly has been present for most
of mankind’s history and was solved, with many instances of individual
failure, through family or community support networks. It was only after
the combined effect of the demographic transition (which resulted in
smaller families) and the definition of labor as a marketable ability that
could be exchanged for money that the traditional arrangements began
to lose effectiveness. Social security systems were created to replace those
schemes, due to the initiative of unions, employers, and lawmakers. In any
case, and with many variations in design and implementation, the systems
created during the last century were developed to provide income security
to the elderly.
Due to its origins and a conceptual approach based on the Bismarckian
model, the pension system in Argentina has been mostly contributive.
The rationale is quite simple: pensions are payments designed to replace
earnings when workers are forced to retire. Thus, the best way to assign
these payments is by identifying those who were receiving payments for
their work, and then replace these payments in a reasonable proportion.
While the early system designers focused on specific groups of workers,
the system rapidly evolved into a national scheme. By the late 1940s it was
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clear that access to social security was considered a basic right of any citizen.
In fact, a constitutional amendment approved in 1949 established the ‘right
to social security’. With this goal, new laws were approved to extend social
security coverage to all workers, assuming that all workers would participate
and the system would become universal. Logically, legal coverage extended
much faster than effective coverage.5 The number of workers contributing
to the pension system expanded for several decades but as the system
matured and labor market problems became more prevalent, the increase
lost momentum. In the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, the percentage of
salaried workers with contributions to social security was close to 80 percent
in 1980 but declined to around 75 percent in 1985, 70 percent in 1990, and
66 percent in 1993—the time of the reform. This effect was compounded
by the increase in unemployment.
Analysts have argued that the introduction of funded individual accounts
in a pension system should result in higher participation, as a response to
the incentives created for workers (Piñera 1991). However, opposing effects
appear to have been much stronger, as the trend on coverage since the
reform has continued to be negative. Figure 15-3 shows the proportion of
the labor force contributing to a pension system in Argentina from 1992
to 2004.6 The declining trend discussed earlier continued after the reform,
as the percentage of the labor force paying monthly contributions to social
security decreased from more than 45 percent in the early 1990s to less than
35 percent in the early 2000s. This decline was caused partly by growing
unemployment, but the trend among occupied workers and even wage
earners was similar.
The decline in participation since the early 1990s has been important,
but the composition of this decline has become a serious problem, as Figure
15-4 shows. In the early 1990s participation by income among occupied
workers was homogeneous, as the rates varied from 40 percent for the
poorest to 60 percent for the fourth quintile. As the overall rate declined,
the composition of the contributors changed dramatically. The two richest
quintiles improved their participation rates, by 7 percentage points in the
case of the fourth quintile and 17 points for the richest quintile. On the
other extreme, the poorest workers saw their participation decline rapidly,
as the second quintile reduced its participation from almost 60 percent to
less than 20 percent, and the poorest went from 40 percent to under 2
percent.
Because the pension system in Argentina is mostly contributive, the
proportion and composition of workers participating is important, since
these factors determine workers’ future right to receive benefits. However,
the most relevant variable to assess the performance of a pension system
is the percentage of the elderly receiving benefits, because the goal of the
system is precisely to provide these benefits.
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Figure 15-3. Rate of contribution of labor force, total and by income (1992–2004).
(Source: Rofman and Lucchetti 2006.)
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Figure 15-4. Participation of occupied workers by income decile (1992–2004).
(Source: Rofman and Lucchetti 2006.)
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Figure 15-5. Coverage of the pension system among the elderly (1992–2004).
(Source: Rofman and Lucchetti 2006.)

Data obtained from urban household surveys since the early 1990s show
that coverage among the elderly reached a maximum by 1993–5, when 77
percent of the elderly were receiving a pension benefit, and then began to
decline, by almost 1 percentage point per year, to 65 percent by 2004. This
reduction was caused by the long-term negative trend in labor force participation and the introduction of stricter requirements in the system with the
1993 reform. It is important to mention that this data is not limited to the
SIJP but considers as covered all individuals receiving benefits from other
national or subnational schemes, including the noncontributory program
(see Figure 15-5).

Other Impacts: Institutions and Markets
The creation of the funded scheme in the national pension system introduced several new areas of concern for analysts and regulators. Among
the most relevant problems that deserve careful attention are (a) the role
and performance of the institutions at the policy design, supervision, and
operational levels; (b) the development of market conditions, competition,
and costs; and (c ) the investment policies, including regulations, managers’
strategies, impacts on capital markets, and response to the financial crisis
of 2001.
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Figure 15-6. Institutional framework of Argentina’s national social security system.
(Source: author’s own.)

The New Institutional Setting
When the new system was created in 1994, several institutions had to be
organized or adapted to cover three functional levels (see Figure 15-6).
1. Policy design and regulations became the responsibility of the Ministerio de Trabajo (MT, or Ministry of Labor), through the Secretaría
de Seguridad Social (SSS, or Social Security Secretariat), and, in some
aspects, the Ministerio de Economía (ME, or Ministry of Economy),
through the Secretaría de Finanzas (SF, or Finance Secretary).
2. Two public institutions, the newly created Superintendencia de
Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (SAFJP, or
Superintendency of Pension Funds) and the existing Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nacion (SSN, or Superintendency of Insurance),
became responsible for overseeing activities of the private agencies
and issuing lower-level regulations.
3. Finally, four groups of institutions took operational responsibility:
a The Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSES, or
National Social Security Administration), an autonomous agency
under the SSS, continued to manage the residual PAYGO scheme,
including paying benefits to retirees under the old system, paying
PAYGO benefits to those that chose the public scheme for the second pillar, providing basic pensions for all new retirees, and paying
transitional benefits to those with contributions before the reform.
b Specialized companies, Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones
y Pensiones (AFJP, or pension fund management companies),
became responsible for managing the new pension funds. Directly
supervised by the SAFJP, they manage individual accounts, invest
assets, and process and pay benefit requests.
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c Existing or newly created insurance companies, under the direct
supervision of the SSN and, for some tasks, the SAFJP, became
responsible for managing insurance schemes, including disability
and survivor’s policies for the AFJPs and annuities for beneficiaries.
d Finally, the Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos (AFIP, or
Federal Public Revenue Administration) continued to collect all
contributions and distribute them to ANSES and the pension funds.
The performance of these institutions since 1994 has varied. At the policy
design level, the role of the Ministry of Labor and the Social Security Secretariat was weaker than originally expected. Many policy initiatives came
exclusively from the Ministry of Economy, and the political space of the SSS
slowly declined, as they lost staff and budget. The ‘emergency mode’ that
defined most policy decisions in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Argentina
reduced the relevance of analytical areas in the government, a trend that
was particularly damaging for the social security system. Hierarchical lines
were rarely respected, and in many cases the Ministry of Economy or the
president appointed authorities to ANSES and the Superintendency of
Pension Funds without consulting the Ministry of Labor.
While the supervisory agencies have an autonomous status that should
preserve their independence from political pressures, the experience during the first 10 years of the new pension system shows that this independence is limited when pressures are strong enough. The role of the SAFJP
has been different from that of SSN, as the former has made important
efforts to be proactive and focus its attention on protecting the workers’
interests while the latter has had a more traditional approach, preserving
‘system integrity’ even if that means affecting beneficiaries’ rights.
At the operational level, since the mid-1990 ANSES has had a
strong record of implementing institutional improvements and simplifying
processes. They have increased transparency and reduced delays in granting benefits, and taken some steps to reduce fraud. However, ANSES still
has much to do in terms of achieving efficiency, transparency, and political
independence. The agency manages a huge budget—nearly 40 percent of
the total national budget—which unavoidably makes it the focus of many
political interests.
Much controversy surrounds the role of AFIP, as the sole institution
responsible for collecting and enforcing contributions to the social security
system. Supporters of this arrangement have argued that, because AFIP
manages all contribution databases for national taxes and social security,
it has the advantage of being able to crosscheck information and enforce
payment. Opponents, on the other hand, have argued that social security
is too low in the AFIP’s priorities, as most salaried workers are employed by
relatively small firms or are independent workers. Meanwhile, AFIP efforts
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are focused on a small group of high contributors who are responsible for
as much as 80 percent of revenues from income and value-added taxes.
However, because they are not labor-intensive companies, their share in
social security contributions is much smaller. There have been many proposals to separate the collection of taxes from social security contributions,
including plans that would transfer this function to ANSES or to a new
independent agency. The government implemented this last proposal in
2001, with the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Recaudación de los
Recursos de la Seguridad Social (INARSS, or National Institute for Collection of Social Security Revenue), but this institute was never fully functional
and closed a couple of years later.

Market Development: Competition and Costs
When the government instituted the new private system in 1994, 24 managing companies started operations. These AFJPs were owned by a diverse
group of stockholders, including banks, insurance companies, governmentowned agencies, health services providers, individuals, and even a soccer
club. Almost 85 percent were from financial institutions, and 69 percent
were domestic. The evolution of the market composition has been rapid.
By the end of 2005 there were only 11 AFJPs. Of stockholders, 76 percent were from financial institutions, and only 58 percent were domestic.
Concentration has also evolved. In 1995 nearly 50 percent of affiliates
were enrolled in the four largest funds. By late 2001, this percentage
had grown to 75 percent, falling to 61.5 percent by early 2007 (SAFJP
2007).
Although the new funded scheme was optional—workers could choose
between it and the second pillar—whenever a worker did not make an
explicit choice, administrators would assign the worker to an AFJP. During
the first year of the new system, nearly 50 percent of workers registered in
the SIJP had chosen an AFJP, 41 percent had chosen the PAYGO scheme,
and 9 percent had been randomly assigned to an AFJP. Over the next
9 years, the proportion of assigned workers steadily grew; by mid-2005, 4 out
of every 10 workers affiliated with an SIJP had entered the system through
this channel.
As in other Latin-American countries, market competition has been a
serious concern for regulators. Demand has shown low price elasticity, and
the managing companies’ returns became extremely high, particularly in
the late 1990s. From the introduction of the system to late 2001, average
fees were stable, at around 3.5 percent of wages. Meanwhile, operational
costs declined as early investments were amortized and economies of scale
realized. Consequently, returns in the industry grew rapidly: by 1999 and
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2000 returns on equity were over 20 percent. However, these rates declined
and became negative in 2002 and later, mostly because of poor financial
management.
The history of competition among the AFJPs has been strongly defined
by changes in regulations. We can identify 4 different periods, with different determinants and outcomes. The first period goes from mid-1994,
when the AFJPs began enrolling workers, until the end of that year,
when efforts to attract individuals to the funded scheme ended. During this period, the managers focused on capturing the largest possible
share of the new market, developing large networks of branch offices
and sales forces and making large marketing expenditures. The tight link
between commercial expenditures and the number of affiliates each AFJP
obtained shaped the future distribution of the market. Regulatory decisions reinforced this trend by randomly assigning workers who did not
explicitly choose a company in proportion to the market share of each
fund.
By early 1995 AFJPs entered a second phase when they were authorized
to transfer affiliates. Consequently, the number of salespeople declined
by nearly 75 percent, and a new period of relative calm but growing
competition began. The ratio of annual transfers went from 19 percent
in 1995 to 26 percent in 1996 and 32 percent in 1997. As the trend was
accelerating (the annualized rate for the second semester of 1997 reached
38 percent), expenditures in sales force rapidly increased and concerns
about the ‘inefficient spending’ of the industry became widespread. After
many discussions, the Superintendency of the AFJP issued new regulations
complicating transfers. Most AFJPs responded by rapidly reducing their
marketing efforts.
From early 1998 to late 2001 the market was very calm, with few efforts
to expand the overall contributor base and even fewer efforts to attract
affiliates from other AFJPs. Only one AFJP showed significant net gains in
affiliates, increasing its market share by an annual rate of 10–15 percent.
The overall ratio of transfers to contributors sharply declined to onethird of its previous value. Marketing costs, which in 1997 had accounted
for more than 50 percent of operational costs, also declined, by nearly
40 percent in 3 years.
The most recent period began when the fiscal and financial crisis of
2001 directly affected the AFJP industry. The economic turmoil created
confusion, and two important reforms enacted in November of that year
altered market conditions: (a) workers’ contribution rates went from 11 to
5 percent of gross wages, and (b) a change in insurance policies brought
these costs to nearly zero in the short term. Reacting to these changes,
AFJPs sharply reduced their fees, which resulted in little change in competition or transfers. Other changes, such as the creation of a new AFJP
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in 2001 and the differential impact of the financial crisis, had some minor
effects, though by mid-2005, transfers were still very low.
The insurance industry has had a different history. Insurers that provide
death and disability protection do not compete to attract workers. Rather,
they sell their policies to the AFJPs, usually within the same economic
group. While analysts, policymakers, and industry experts have discussed
the determinants and evolution of AFJP costs, the analysis of the life
insurance market has been less intense, probably because the supervisory
agency has a less proactive attitude. Regulations state that AFJPs must
select their insurer through a competitive process, whereby they publicly
request bids every year. However, with very few exceptions, AFJPs hire
insurance companies within their economic group at rates that are not
transparent.
Designers of the funded scheme expected the cost of death and disability insurance to be around 1 percent of taxable wages. In the early
years of the system, mortality was much lower than expected, and market
analysts disagreed on whether these numbers were in line with the longterm expected rates or whether there was a delay in claims processing that
would eventually catch up. As claims increased over the next few years,
so did rates. These rates in part reflected the higher actual payments but,
given the observed delay, they were also affected by concerns about future
increases in claims. By 2001 the average insurance costs had grown by 60
percent compared to the 1995 rates. Most analysts agreed that these costs
would continue to grow.
In late 2001 the government enacted a new regulation allowing insurance companies to disregard expected payments. Consequently, costs
rapidly declined to less than 0.5 percent of salaries but then began to
grow again. By early 2007 they had reached their highest level ever, at 1.41
percent of salaries (SAFJP 2007). Although some analysts have argued that
the growing costs are because the medical boards responsible for assessing
disability claims are overly lenient, a report from the Superintendency of
Pension Funds shows that these boards have been very consistent over the
years, with an approval rate of around 60 percent of claims (SAFJP 2004).
Furthermore, the data show that the absolute number of claims has been
stable since the comparable data was collected in 2000.
The Investment Policies: Regulations, Strategies, Crises, and Responses
Asset management under the new funded scheme has also been the target of controversy. The law and regulations were restrictive regarding
diversification—setting maximum investment limits by type of instrument
and issuer—and required minimum risk ratings to increase security. Regulations also limited international diversification, as in other countries in the
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region. Following Chile, the Argentine system also includes a guaranteed
minimum return, defined as either 70 percent of the market average or the
average minus 2 percentage points, whichever is lower.
Portfolios have been highly concentrated in domestic government securities, nearly always at the established limit of 50 percent, or even higher
because of valuation changes and short-term regulation adjustments. The
high incidence of public debt during most of the period can be explained
by the high returns generated by these instruments. However, during the
2001–2 crisis, when authorities actively promoted and sometimes required
that the AFJPs increase their exposure, this percentage went well beyond
the limit (see Table 15-2).
Regulations on diversification have not been binding, except in a few
particular cases. This is also true for investments in foreign assets, as the
maximum limit has been 17 percent of the funds’ value and actual investments never exceeded 10 percent. On the other hand, the minimum return
guarantee has had an important effect both directly—several AFJPs have
had to compensate their affiliates for low returns—and indirectly—pension
fund managers tend to replicate their investment strategies to avoid falling
below the minimum return.
Despite the controversies over the impact of the 2001–2 crisis on the
financial status of the pension funds, real returns in the system have been
reasonable over time. Analysts and fund managers predicted in early 2002
that the government default would result in a catastrophic loss for the
pension funds, by as much as 45 percent.7 These assessments were exaggerated, the result of comparing nominal dollar values of assets before and
after the default and negotiations. The actual evolution of pension funds’
real returns should be measured in local currency. The pension funds have
produced an average real return of nearly 10 percent per year since 1995.
While volatility has been important, in some cases it can be attributed to
a delay in adjusting valuation to the actual conditions of the market (see
Figure 15-7).

What Is Next?
The pension system in Argentina appears to have survived the worst of the
2001–2 crisis in relatively good condition, but several problems that preexisted it were somewhat worsened and require urgent attention. Public
debate about the pension system has been focused on topics that appear
to be relevant in the short term but have little if any importance in
terms of long-term strategy. Meanwhile, some of the most important structural problems—such as declining coverage, dysfunctional institutional
design, weak competition, high costs in the funded scheme, and residual
fragmentation—have been neglected.
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Source: SAFJP (2005).
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Table 15-2 Portfolio Composition of Pension Funds (in %)
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Figure 15-7. Pension fund real annual returns. (Source: SAFJP 2005.)

Coverage
As discussed earlier, workers’ participation in the pension system has
steadily declined in the past two decades, a process that reflects deep
changes in the economic structure and the labor market at the national
level. This decline cannot be fully explained, nor can it be fixed with
reforms. However, to continue performing its role as a provider of income
security to the elderly, the system must adapt to the new reality.
There are several areas where policymakers might have an impact, and
each of them should be carefully considered. First and foremost, at the
national level, Argentina has a fragmented model that could be better
integrated to improve coverage and reduce gaps. The 3 schemes of basic
benefits—the PBU, or basic benefit for those retiring under the standard
system, received at age 60 or 65 years with a minimum of 30 years of
contributions; an ‘old-age’ benefit, received at age 70 years with a minimum
of 10 years of contributions; and a noncontributory benefit—are sometimes
inconsistent and exclude many potential beneficiaries. Several measures
in recent years have attempted to repair these inconsistencies, including
reforms in the noncontributory pension scheme and a simplification of
rules for back payments for the self-employed (a de facto reduction in the
requirement of 30 years with contributions). However, these changes are
not part of a clear strategy to expand coverage, especially for the poorest.
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As of 2005, nearly 60 percent of expenditures were being financed with
taxes or transfers, and this proportion is likely to decline in the future.
Given that the public system has clearly moved away from a purely contributive financing scheme, the division between contributive and noncontributive schemes has become somewhat artificial, and a serious discussion
of the reasonability of continuing to discriminate among beneficiaries on
this basis is necessary. While sharp changes in the benefit structure are
not possible or desirable for political, social, and legal reasons, authorities
could try to focus the debate in the system design for the medium and
long term, and discuss the transition mechanisms to reach that model
later.

Institutional Design
The institutional design of the pension system at the national level in
Argentina is good, with clear separation of policymaking, supervisory, and
operational roles among institutions. However, these roles are not always
respected, and the limits between these three levels are often blurred.
Correcting this problem is not simple, as political forces tend to override
normative structures, yet it might be possible to improve it by reinforcing the existing model and by prohibiting officials and institutions from
going beyond their assigned functions. Legislation could be made clearer
regarding the definition of ANSES as an operational agency with no policymaking responsibilities, or authorities could reinforce the independence of
the Superintendency of AFJP. However, taking these steps would certainly
require strong political commitment from current and future authorities.
Alternatively, the government could redesign the institutional structure,
reducing the number of agencies and abandoning specialization as the
main organizing principle. Thus, ANSES could take on both policy design
and operational functions, which would give it a much higher status in the
government structure, perhaps at the level of a ministry. Other countries
have taken this approach, which has some advantages, as it eliminates the
source of institutional conflicts, but also carries risks, as it concentrates too
much unsupervised power in one institution.

Competition in the Funded System
By bringing in multiple private providers to manage the pension funds,
the system designers had hoped that market competition would bring
about improved services and declining costs. However, the providers have
focused most of their competitive efforts on marketing, with only a few
cases where differences in costs, services, or returns had a relevant role.
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Inadequate incentives for participants are the primary cause for this lack
of competition. Affiliates have shown little interest in switching to the
least expensive or more profitable pension fund, and system regulations
have done little to reverse this situation. The original legislation made
switching pension funds difficult, and regulations made the task even
more so.
Because the government creates the rules to assign workers who did
not choose an AFJP, it has a powerful tool for promoting competition.
However, until 2001 the criterion used to assign workers was not procompetitive. Originally, they were distributed in proportion to the number
of workers enrolled in each AFJP. Nearly 3.7 million workers were assigned
following these criteria. In 2001 legislators implemented a new criterion
whereby ‘undefined’ workers were enrolled in the least expensive pension
funds, at a time when the flow of new affiliates was much smaller—only
1.1 million workers were assigned with this criterion between 2001 and
2005.
Experiences in other countries show that enhancing demand awareness
is difficult but some actions, such as public information campaigns, can
increase it. Others, such as simplifying switching procedures, can facilitate
switching. Peru recently changed its regulations to permit switches through
the Internet and enabled managers to sign workers to long-term contracts.
This change was immediately followed by the entrance of a new provider in
the market and a sharp reduction of fees by all participants. In Chile some
have proposed allowing group and long-term contracting. Other countries
have implemented more ineffectual changes. In Colombia, for example,
policymakers tried to set up a maximum fee, but all managing companies
adjusted to the maximum fee without any competition.

System Fragmentation
The pension system in Argentina was born as a fragmented model, with
many institutions and schemes operating in parallel. For most of the twentieth century, each government, knowing that fragmentation had led to
inequities and sustainability problems, tried to integrate these pension
schemes. In this context, the reform of 1994 and the transfer of provincial civil servants to the national system was aimed at unifying the social
insurance system at the national level.
The integration trend lost momentum in the late 1990s, and more than
100 independent schemes that cover provincial level civil servants or professional groups still exist, with insufficient supervision and coordination.
Many of these programs are very small, with their own rules and financial
schemes. While many are well managed and requirements are stricter than
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in the national system, workers usually suffer due to problems of portability, and the medium- and long-term sustainability of the programs is not
clear. Recent legislation appears to be intensifying fragmentation, with the
creation of several new civil servant and professional funds at the provincial
level and the reinstatement of special schemes within the national system
for occupational groups.
As in any social insurance scheme, integration of systems appears to be a
desirable strategy. Larger pools are better able to distribute risks, and multiple systems unavoidably generate inequities across the population. Policymakers should renew the drive towards integration, either institutionally—
that is, progressively integrating all systems into the national SIJP—or by
developing a better coordinated supervision system, ensuring access, sustainability, and equity across the system.

Recent Changes
In late 2005 Argentina’s government began to refocus its interest in the
pension system. Several reforms approved since then have had and will have
a significant impact on the system’s operation and performance. In 2005,
under a generous financial agreement, the government approved a program that would allow individuals who had been self-employed before 1994
but had failed to make contributions to pay off their debt. This program
originally seemed like a minor collection measure but turned out to be a
de facto universalization of the system. Lower-level regulations established
that all these workers could apply for retirement benefits immediately after
making the first installment of their payment plan, and that they would
receive benefits as long as they continue to pay their monthly obligation.
Though no official data is available, it has been estimated that by December
2006, 1.5–2 million new beneficiaries had been added to the system, nearly
doubling the number of beneficiaries.
In early 2007 the government announced a legislative reform expanding
the role of the public system by automatically assigning unaffiliated new
workers to the public system, raising its replacement rate, and allowing
workers in the private system to switch back to the state-managed system.
Other changes proposed in this reform include the elimination of disability
and survivors insurance, as these benefits would be financed directly by the
pension funds, and the introduction of a maximum fee for AFJPs to reduce
costs.
While it is still too soon to assess the impact of these proposals on the
pension system in Argentina, they will probably result in a much smaller
private pillar, with a role limited to providing complementary benefits to a
relatively small proportion of middle- and high-income workers.
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Notes
1
The Argentine reform also included elements from the Peruvian system. For a
full discussion of that system and the Chilean system, refer to Carranza and Morón
(this volume) and Arenas de Mesa et al. (this volume).
2
The system includes more than 80% of the labor force; the only workers not
covered under the national scheme are the police, the military, civil servants at the
provincial level in 14 of the 24 provinces, and independent professional workers
(lawyers, engineers, medics, etc.) working at the provincial level.
3
This concept was proposed in an international workshop by Elsa Rodriguez
Romero, an Argentine expert on pension law, who noted that the new schemes
are characterized not by the fact that the contribution is known, but rather by an
unknown future benefit.
4
Rofman, Stirparo, and Lattes (1997) estimate that, by 2025, the national system
would be spending 2% of GDP; Grushka (2002) estimates expenditures of 2.4%;
and the SSS (2005) estimates expenditures of 2.15%.
5
Measuring coverage in pension schemes is a complex issue. Problems in definitions, availability and quality of data, and interpretation of indicators have produced
controversy and confusion. This chapter considers that workers who contribute to a
pension system are covered by it during their active years, and coverage among
the elderly is estimated by comparing the number of individuals aged 65 years
and older with retirement benefits with the total population of that age. For a
discussion of problems, limitations, and caveats in definitions and data, see Rofman
(2006).
6
The household surveys in Argentina do not ask about contributions of the selfemployed. Data shown in this chapter assumes that all self-employed are uncovered,
an assumption that underestimates coverage but not significantly. According to
registration data, the proportion of the self-employed contributing to social security
has been around 10%, which would increase the overall coverage by approximately
3 percentage points.
7
This figure was included in a press release issued by the UAFJP in March 2002, as
reported by Cronista (2002).
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